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Romines: Romines: Supreme Court Defines Final Decisions

The Supreme Court Defines "Final
Decisions" Relating to Arbitration
Decisions and Ducks the More
Important "Costs" Issue
Green Tree FinancialCorp. - Alabama v. Randolph'
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Green Tree FinancialCortp. - Alabama v.
Randolph dealt with two arbitration issues of varying import. The less controversial
issue involved defining the term 'final decision' in the context of arbitration
proceedings. 2 The second major issue in the case provided the Court an opportunity
to analyze cost assignments in arbitration agreements that were silent on the issue.3
This issue has generated considerable policy disagreement among the circuits.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Larketta Randolph ("Randolph") purchased a mobile home from Better Cents
Home Builders, Inc., in Opelika, Alabama.4 Randolph financed her purchase
through Green Tree Financial Corporation ("Green Tree") and its subsidiary.5 Green
Tree's Manufactured Home Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement
required Randolph to buy Vendor's Single Interest insurance to protect Green Tree
against repossession costs in the event of default. 6 The cgreement also provided that
all contractually-related disputes, "whether arising under case or statutory law,
would be resolved by binding arbitration."7
Randolph later sued Green Tree, "alleging that they [had] violated the Truth In
Lending Act (TILA) ... by failing to disclose as a finance charge the Vendor's

Single Interest Insurance requirement."" Before trial, Randolph amended her
complaint adding a claim that Green Tree had violated the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act by requiring her to arbitrate statutory causes of action. 9 Green Tree responded
by filing a motion requesting the court to compel arbitration, stay the action, or to
dismiss Randolph's claims.'0 The district court "granted [Green Tree's] motion to
compel arbitration, denied the motion to stay, and dismissed Randolph's claims with

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

531 U.S. 79 (2000).
Id. at 79-80.
Id. at 80-81.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 83. See TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994).
Green Tree, 531 U.S. 83. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691() (1994).
Id.
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prejudice."" Randolph responded by requesting reconsideration, asserting a lack of
resources to arbitrate, which she claimed would require her to forgo her claims
against Green Tree.' 2 The District Court denied her motion for reconsideration. 3
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the lower court's actions constituted
a "final decision," satisfying its jurisdictional requirement for review.' In reaching
its decision, the appellate court relied on section sixteen of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA") which governs appeals. 5 Section sixteen of the FAA allows appeal
from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title."' 16 The
court determined that a final order subject to appeal under the FAA is one that
disposed of all the issues framed in a particular case. 17 The court of appeals found
that the district court's decision left nothing to be done, aside from execution of the
court's order, and therefore that it fell within the FAA definition of a final order. 8
After establishing jurisdiction, the court of appeals confronted the assignment of
arbitration costs issue.9 The court held that the parties' arbitration agreement "failed
to provide the minimum guarantees that [Randolph] could vindicate her statutory
rights under TILA." ° A critical factor in the court's determination was that "the
agreement was silent with respect to payment of filing fees, arbitrators' costs, and
other arbitration expenses."'" Based on this fact, the court held the parties'
agreement posed a risk that Randolph's "ability to vindicate her statutory rights
would be undone by 'steep' arbitration costs, and therefore was unenforceable. 2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmned in part and
reversed in part.23 The Court held that when a district court orders parties to proceed
to arbitration and dismisses all claims it is a final decision under section 16(a)(3) of
the FAA.24 The Court also held that parties seeking to avoid arbitration due to
prohibitive costs shoulder the burden of proving "the likelihood of incurring such
costs."2

II.LEGAL HISTORY
To reach the decision concerning the impact of cost assignments in arbitration
agreements silent on the topic, the Court was forced to first deal with the issue of
reviewability, specifically, whether orders by district courts compelling arbitration
can be appealed as 'final decisions' under section 16(a)(3) of the FAA.26 The Court

11. Id.
12. Id.at 83-84.
13. Id.at 84.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. F.A.A., 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) (1994).
17. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at84.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 89.
25. Id.at 92.
26. Id. at 85-89.
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then turned to the controversial issue of whether arbitration agreements, which are
silent as to assignment of costs, are unenforceable.27
A. 'Finaldecisions 'for appeal in the arbitrationcontext
Section sixteen of the FAA specifically governs appellate review of arbitration
orders."
Before analyzing the section explicitly, one is confronted with the
framework elucidated by the Court in Moses v. Mercury Constr. Corp,2 9 which
recognized the policy goal of the FAA to "move the parties to an arbitrable dispute
out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible."30 The appellate
review section of the FAA begins by listing several situations involving arbitrationrelated decisions by lower courts that are appealable." Subsection (a)(1) generally
permits immediate appeal of orders hostile to arbitration, and it is expanded by
subsection (a)(2), which allows appeal whether an order is final or interlocutory so
long as it satisfies the arbitration-hostility notion embodied by subsection (a)(1 ).3
However, subsection (a)(3) specifically preserves the right to appeal "a final
decision with respect to an arbitration ....
,3'The third subsection, unlike its two
predecessors, does not discriminate between decisions favorable and hostile to
arbitration.34 Thus, the Court has found the meaningful question in this area to be
whether a decision regarding arbitration is 'final.' 35 The long-standing definition of
'final decision' in other legal contexts is a decision that "ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment., 36 The
FAA does not define 'final decision' for its purposes; however, courts have, on prior
occasion, thereby applied to the term its well-established meaning.37 While the FAA
permits parties to arbitration agreements to bring a separate proceeding in a district
court to enter judgement on an arbitration award once it is made, the Court on two
prior occasions indicated, but did not hold, that the existence of such a remedy does
not vitiate the finality of district courts' disposition of cases on the merits coupled
with orders compelling arbitration.38
Another important factor to appellate courts in determining the finality of
arbitration-related decisions is whether the claim for arbitration is "embedded" in an
action involving other claims for relief or is "independent," constituting the sole

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 89-92.
See 9 U.S.C. § 16.
460 U.S. 1 (1983).
Id. at 22.
9 U.S.C. § 16.
See id. at §§ 16(a)(l)-(a)(2)..
ld.at § 16(a)(3).
Id.
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct,Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994); Evans v. U.S., 504

U.S. 255, 259-60 (1992).
36. Digital, 511 U.S. at 867.
37. Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60.
38. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427,431 (1956) (explaining that had the district
court dismissed all claims in an action, its decision would be final and appealable); Catlin v. U.S., 324
U.S.229, 236 (noting that had a motion to dismiss been entered "clearly there would have been an end
of the litigation and appeal would lie...
").These cases were not decided under the FAA, but the court
uses analogous reasoning when analyzing the finality issue under the FAA.
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issue before a court.39 Jurisdictions that emphasize the importance of the distinction
between "embedded" and "independent" proceedings have held that orders
compelling arbitration in "independent" proceedings are final and reviewable, while
the same orders in "embedded" proceedings are not (even if the district court
dismisses the remaining claims).40
B. The Impact ofArbitration Agreements
That Are Silent RegardingCost Assignments
The bedrock principle governing any analysis concerning silence in arbitration
agreement as to particular terms is the principle set forth in section two of the FAA.
Section two states that "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract.., shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
'
of any contract. 41
Another principle paramount in this area stated by the Court is
that it is the purpose of the FAA "to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements..,
and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing
42
as other contracts.
Citing the importance of the usual validity of arbitration agreements as well as the
necessity of combating judicial hostility, the Court has recognized that federal
statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration. 43 By doing so, the
Court has rejected generalized attacks on arbitration resting on the "suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law
to would-be complainants. 44 The Court in Mitsubishi expressly approved the
arbitrability of statutory rights "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum ....
The Court undertakes a two-part test in determining whether statutory claims may
be vindicated in arbitral forums.46 First, the Court asks whether parties agreed to

39. Seacoast Motors of Salisbury, Inc., v. Chrysler Corp., 143 F.3d 626, 628-29 (1st Cir. 1998);
Altman Nursing. Inc., v. Clay CapitalCorp., 84 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 1996); Napleton v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 138 F.3d 1209, 1212 (7th Cir. 1998); Gammaro v. Thorp ConsumerDisc.Co., 15 F.3d 93,95 (8th
Cir. 1994); McCarthy v. ProvidentialCorp., 122 F.3d 1242, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997). While all of these
cases were abrogated by Green Tree, they illustrate the point that this issue was traditionally important.
See also Arnold v. Arnold Corp-PrintedCommuns.for Bus., 920 F.2d 1269, 1276 (6th Cir. 1990) (order
compelling arbitration in an "embedded" proceeding treated as a final judgment when the district court
dismissed the action in deference to arbitration and had nothing left to do but execute the judgement);
Armijo v. PrudentialIns. Co. ofAmerica, 72 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1995).
40. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
41. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).

42. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
43. Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of
1933); Shearson/AmericanExpress v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Sherman Act).
44. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481.
45. Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 637.
46. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-28. For a clear articulation of this test, see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
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submit their claims to arbitration.47 Second, whether Congress has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.48
In analyzing the second prong of the test, the Court often refers to the "liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," as justification for rarely
invalidating agreements that are silent on issues such as assignment of arbitration
49
costs.
The designation of burdens of proof with regard to costs also favors
enforcement of arbitration agreements at common law. 0 The Court has repeatedly
made clear that the party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of establishing
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration of the statutory claim at issue."1
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority's approach
2
The majority in Green Tree dealt first with the jurisdictional question.1
Following the lead of the court of appeals, the Court began with an analysis of FAA
section sixteen, which governs appeals." The Court acknowledged that section
sixteen allows appeal from decisions hostile to arbitration, but does not authorize
immediate appeal from decisions favoring the use of arbitration.5 4 However, the
Court reached its decision by relying on the 'final decision' catch-all contained in
subsection (a)(3)." According to the Court, "the term 'final decision' has a welldeveloped and longstanding meaning. 56 The Court said that since the FAA did not
supply a definition for the term it should be accorded its well-established meaning. 7
Because the district court's order compelled arbitration and dismissed Randolph's
claims with prejudice (leaving only execution of the judgment), the Court held the
order disposed of the entire case on the merits and that it was thus a "final
judgement" for purposes of appeal.58 The Court also acknowledged the FAA allows
parties to arbitration agreements to bring separate proceedings to district courts to
enter judgement, vacate, or modify arbitration awards, but said the existence of that
remedy "does not vitiate the finality of the district court's resolution of the claims
in the instant proceeding."59 Citing precedent indicating similar results, the Court
then ruled conclusively that the [d]istrict [c]ourt's order was "a final decision with

47. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
48. Id.
49. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
50. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
51. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
52. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 84-90.
53. Id. (referring to 9 U.S.C. § 16).
54. Id. at 86.
55. Id. See 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3).
56. A final decision "ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the court to do but
execute the judgement." Id. (quoting Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S.at 867).
57. Id. (citing Evans, 504 U.S. at 259-60).
58. Id. at 86-87.
59. Id. at 86 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 9-11).
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respect to an arbitration within the meaning of section 16(a)(3)" and that the appeal
was timely. 60
The Court then discussed the independent/embedded debate among appellate
courts. 6' Green Tree argued that the distinction (and impact on reviewability)
between cases where an arbitration request was the sole claim as opposed to one of
several claims for relief, was firmly established at the time of section sixteen's
enactment, and that the section's silence evidenced a congressional intent to
incorporate the distinction into the FAA. 62 The Court disagreed, citing cases
demonstrating a lack of uniformity of opinion on decisional finality at the time of
section sixteen's enactment as reason for applying the well-established meaning of
'final decision.' 63 Finally, the Court held that when a district court orders parties to
proceed to arbitration and dismisses all claims before it, the decision is final under
section 16(a)(3), and therefore appealable. 4
After establishing jurisdiction, the Court turned to the question of enforceability
of arbitration agreements that do not explicitly provide protection from potentially
substantial costs for parties pursuing statutory claims in arbitral forums .65 The Court,
following precedent, stated that "so long as the prospective litigant may vindicate
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum" even important statutory
rights (like TILA) may be arbitrated.66
The Court reemphasized that "generalized attacks on arbitration that rest on
'suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the
substantive law to would-be complainants"' would not be recognized, and that
arbitration opponents must invalidate the forum's applicability under their test. 67 In
Green Tree, the Court stated it was undisputed that the parties agreed to arbitrate
their disputes relating to their contract, including all claims involving statutory
rights.68 In regard to the second part of the Court's test, Randolph did not argue that
TILA evidenced a congressional intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies.69
Instead, Randolph argued that the arbitration agreement's silence with respect to
costs created a "risk" that "she [would] be required to bear prohibitive arbitration
costs if she pursue[d] her statutory rights in an arbitral forum," thus forcing her to
forego her claims against Green Tree.7 °
The Court acknowledged that "the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal
statutory rights in an arbitral forum," but said that the record failed to show that
Randolph would bear such costs if she took her claims to arbitration.7 Relying on

60. Id. at 86-87 (citing Mackey, 351 U.S. at 431; Catlin 324 U.S. at 236).
61. Id. at 87-89.
62. Id. at 88-89.
63. Id. at 88 nn. 3, 5. See generally Charles Alan Wright, A.R. Miller & E.H. Cooper, Federal
Practiceand Procedurevol. 15B § 3914.17 (3d ed., West Pub]. Co. 1992).
64. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 79.
65. Id.at 89.
66. Id. at 90 (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
67. Id. at 89-90 (quoting Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481).
68. Id. at 90-91.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Id.
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the court of appeal's statement that "we lack... information about how claimants
fare under Green Tree's arbitration clause, 7 2 the Court said the record revealed only
silence on the subject and that such silence alone was "plainly insufficient to render
it unenforceable."73 Finally, the Court held that "the 'risk' that Randolph [would]
costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an
be saddled with prohibitive
74
arbitration agreement.,
The Court said invalidating the arbitration agreement at issue without proof that
the cost allocation would actually preclude Randolph's statutory rights would
undermine the long-accepted "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements., 75 The Court, with this policy in mind, held that when a party seeks
to invalidate an arbitration agreement due to inaccessibility, that party bears the
76
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs. The Court stated flatly
that Randolph, the party in this case who bore the burden, had not satisfied the
burden.77 However, the Court found it unnecessary to address the detail necessary
7
to satisfy the arbitration opponent's primafacie burden. ' Randolph did not make
a timely showing of any evidence as to either excessive costs, or the likelihood of
such costs, and the Court thereby reversed the court of appeal's decision to invalidate
the arbitration order due to potentially-excessive costs precluding Randolph's
statutory rights, and remanded the case with instructions to proceed with
arbitration.79

B. Dissent ConcerningArbitralAccessability
Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by three other Justices, concurred in part, and
dissented in part from the majority's decision."0 The dissenters concurred with the
majority on the 'final decision' issue, but would have vacated the court of appeal's
decision dealing with cost allocation with instructions for the court to more closely
consider the arbitral forum's accessability. 81
The dissent criticized the majority opinion for attempting to blend two inquiries
(adequacy and accessabilityof arbitral forums regarding statutory claims) into one
issue. 2 Citing Gilmer and Shearson as precedent, the dissent acknowledged that
parties resisting arbitration bear the "burden of establishing the inadequacy of an
3
arbitral forum for adjudications of claims of a particular genre."" However, the
dissent disagreed with the majority's notion that the primafacieburden regarding
accessability should be allocated identically to the burden required of opposing

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 90-91 (quoting Green Tree, 178 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11 th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 91 n. 6.
Id. at 91.
Id. (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24).
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 92-3.
Id. at 93-4.
Id. at 94. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; McMahon, 482 U.S. 220.
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parties to demonstrate adequacy of the arbitral forum as a means of adjudicating
statutory rights. 4
The dissent cites the adhesive nature of take-it-or-leave-it contracts, as well as the
fact that past courts examining the adequacy issue did not also consider the
'accessability' issue as reason for caution in assigning burdens to consumers such
as Randolph.8" The dissent buttressed the point by citing the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals which commented on Gilmer:
[I]n Gilmer, the Supreme Court endorsed a system of arbitration in which
employees are not required to pay for the arbitrator assigned to hear their
statutory claims. There is no reason to think that the Court would have
approved arbitration in the absence of this arrangement. Indeed, we are
unaware of any situation in American jurisprudence in which a beneficiary
of a federal statute has been required to pay for the services of a judge
assigned to hear her or his case.86
The dissent reiterated that the form contract at issue provided no indication of
which arbitration rules were applicable, nor whether Randolph would be required to
pay all or a portion of the costs of arbitrating. 7 The dissent implicitly relied on the
doctrine of contra proferentem, stating that Green Tree, as drafter of the contract,
could have filled such a void by indicating its choice of arbitration rules within the
agreement.88 While it may follow that Green Tree would have elected rules which
would not have precluded Randolph's statutory rights, the dissent argued that there
"[was] no reliable indication in the record that Randolph's claim [would] be
arbitrated under any consumer-protective fee arrangement."89 Further, the dissent
also cited Green Tree's repeat player status as a rationale for assigning it the burden
ofproving that the arbitral forum it chooses would not preclude Randolph's statutory
rights. 90
Should the burden of accessability be assigned Green Tree, the dissent argued the
case ought to be remanded for clarification of their practices. 91 If in fact the arbitral
forum was financially accessible it would render the case moot. 92 The dissent saw

84. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 94 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting).
85. Id. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (age discrimination claims are amenable to arbitration); McMahon,
482 U.S. at 220 (claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and Securities
Exchange Act are amenable-to arbitration).
86. Cole v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. App. 1997).
87. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 94-5 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting).
88. Id. The Court referred to Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which states, "[iun choosing among
the reasonable meanings of... [an] agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the [drafting] party ... Id. at 96 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 206 (1979)).
89. Id. at 95.
90. Id. at 96 (citing 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2486 (J. Chadboum rev. ed. 1981)) (where fairness so
requires, burden of proof of a particular fact may be assigned to "party who presumably has peculiar
means of knowledge" of the fact). Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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such an approach as superior to either writing a term into the parties contract93 or
leaving cost allocations initially to each arbitrator as the majority chose to do.94 In
sum, the dissent said, the majority's opinion does not prevent Randolph from
returning to court, post-arbitration, should she incur prohibitive cost allocations.95
Thus, the issue according to the dissent is when, not whether, she may be spared
from paying excessive costs. 96 The time parameters for appeal settled by the
majority serve neither certainty nor judicial economy according to the dissent.97
Four Supreme Court Justices would have remanded to the court of appeals with
Green Tree bearing the burden of proving that assignment of arbitration costs
between the parties would not preclude Randolph's statutory rights before approving
of an order compelling arbitration.98
V. COMMENT
The Court in Green Tree chose to deal with one problem, which has generated
some variance among the circuits, while inviting a future split/fragmentation on an
arguably more-important issue.
The entire Court was in favor of assigning the common law meaning to the term
'final decision. ' 99 The catch-all in section 16(a)(3) of the FAA clearly provides an
avenue for such a decision. '0 The strongest counter argument, that at the time of the
1988 amendments to the section a different meaning was attributed to the term, is
The later emergence of an
quickly discredited by examining timely case law.'
alleged consensus notwithstanding, it is clearly within the Court's province to assign
the long-accepted and widely-recognized meaning of final decision to its inclusion
in the FAA.
However, it is perplexing at best to attempt to grapple with the Court's decision
on the key costs issue raised by Green Tree. The idea behind accepting certiorari in
such cases is to settle disputes among the circuits on arguable questions. The Court
did so by ruling conclusively on the appeal issue.'0 2 However, the Court not only
failed to eradicate future dispute over accessibility of arbitral forums, but seemingly
evidenced an intent to invite such disagreements among the circuits. In one breath
the majority states, "the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant
such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum."'0 3 However, by bootstrapping onto prior cases authorizing the

93. Id. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1485 (interpreting a form contract to require the employer "to pay all
of the arbitrator's fees necessary for a full and fair resolution of [the discharged employee's] statutory
claims").
94. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 96 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting).
95. Id. at 97.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 92.
99. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81.
100. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3). Appeal may be taken from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration
that is subject to this title." Id.
101. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28..
102. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 81.
103. Id. at 90.
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arbitrability of statutory claims," 4 the Court held that plaintiffs in Randolph's
position should also shoulder the burden of proving that prohibitive costs of an
arbitral forum will preclude their statutory rights.' °5 As the dissent is quick to point
out, the two analyses are distinct and it does not follow that the assignment of
burdens in proving arbitrability should mirror those of proving accessibility.' °6 In
fact, careful analysis bears out the need for a different assignment of burdens in the
two distinct situations.
First, as the dissent discusses, the contract is adhesive, and thus when silent
should be construed against the drafter.0 7 Green Tree had every opportunity to
render the entire issue moot by declaring in its arbitration clause that it would utilize
arbitral rules similar to those used by American Arbitration Association, which are
not likely to be deemed cost prohibitive.'
If they chose not to do so, reason does
not counsel that other parties (consumers) should bear the costs of Green Tree's
decision.
Second, Green Tree's repeat player status also counsels against assigning
consumers the burden of proving that the arbitral forum the company chooses will
not bear prohibitive costs for consumers.' 9 Green Tree likely has superior
information concerning consumers' arbitral costs due to their familiarity with prior
arbitrations and their ability to select arbitral rules.
It hardly seems equitable in such a situation to assign the burden of proving
prohibitive costs upon consumers. As the dissent stated in Green Tree, Green Tree
had more exposure to the arbitration process and its costs and was therefore in a
better position to know which rules it had selected in the past and possibly the costs
associated with past arbitration proceedings." 0
Fairness, as well as judicial efficiency, would benefit from companies being
assigned the burden of proving financial accessability in similar cases. As Justice
Ginsburg makes clear in her dissent, the majority's opinion "does not prevent
Randolph from returning to court, post-arbitration, if she then has a complaint about
cost allocation."' In essence, the conservative majority has decided not only to
delay what it acknowledges is a potentially valid claim,"' but has inequitably
assigned the burden of establishing the accessability of arbitration to the party least
equipped to handle such an assignment. '

104. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; Moses, 460 U.S. I.
105. Id. at 92-3 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting).
106. Id. at 94.
107. Id. at 94-5.
108. Id. Under AAA's Consumer arbitration rules, consumers incur no filing fees and pay only $125
of arbitrator's total fees with all other costs assigned to the business party; National Arbitration Forum
provisions limit consumer costs to between $49 and $175; National Consumer Disputes Advisory
Committee, Consumer Due Process Protocol, Principle 6 & Comment (Apr. 17, 1998) available at
<http://www.adr.org/education/education/consumer-protocol.html> (National Consumer Disputes
Advisory Committee protocols recommend that consumer costs be limited to a reasonable amount).
109. Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 96 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting).
110. Id. at 97.
111. Id.
112. The Court implied that if Randolph had been able to meet the prohibitive costs burden, the issue
might have been handled differently. See id. at 91, 93.
113. See id. at 93-4-(Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, & Breyer, JJ. dissenting) (Ginsburg argued about
possible inequalities of such a burden and how it is inconsistent with precedent).
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Worse yet, the Court expressly refused to provide lower courts a scintilla of
guidance as to what constitutes prohibitive costs in the arbitral context. By doing
so, the Court has invited division among lower courts as to what constitutes
inaccessibility. As the 5-4 conservative majority in this case indicates, different
justices, depending on their particular political persuasion, may reach strikingly
different results in regard to what constitutes prohibitive costs which preclude
statutory rights.
While the particular facts of Green Tree may not have been conducive to laying
out definitive rules governing arbitral accessability, 1 4the Court could have enhanced
the utility of its opinion by providing at least some structure for later analysis. The
Court could have chosen a number of avenues in this regard. Even short of holding
that the drafter, which created the problem by its silence regarding cost allocation in
the first place, bear the burden of proving accessability, the court could have
mandated that a certain percentage of costs must be bom by those favoring
arbitration, or imposed a maximum dollar value above which an arbitral forum could
be deemed primafacie inaccessible.
Instead of opting for a creative solution, the Court elected to promote uncertainty
and judicial inefficiency in an area which will require future consideration after a
probable split among the circuit's regarding the definition of "inaccessibility."
VI. CONCLUSION
In Green Tree, the Supreme Court resolved a dispute among the circuits regarding
the definition of 'final decision' in the arbitration context by granting the term of art
its well-established meaning. In regard to the second major issue raised by the case,
the Court acknowledged that arbitral costs could potentially preclude an individual
from vindicating her or his statutory rights. However, without providing needed
guidance as to when such costs may invalidate arbitration agreements, the court
simply assigned arbitration opponents the burden of proving that the forum's cost
will preclude enforcement of their individual statutory rights. While the first element
of the decision will promote uniformity among the circuits, uncertainty and
unfairness will likely be the result of the Court's decision to sidestep the important
issue of arbitral accessability regarding statutory claims.

FRANKLIN D. ROMINES

II

114. Id. at 90-1.
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